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A Review of Research on the
Employment Effect of Artificial
Intelligence Applications
Yang Weiguo, Qiu Zitong, & Wu Qingjun*
Renmin University of China

Abstract:

Based on the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) and the summary of
existing research methods, this essay reviews the theoretical and empirical
research into AI’s impact on industrial distribution, jobs, wages and other
aspects in the field of employment. The essay finds that AI technology
accelerates job polarization in the labor market and causes wage inequality
during this process while taking over some occupations and promoting the
flow of labor among different industries. In the long run, the substitution and
creation effects will coexist for the long term, and the creation effects will
exercise increasingly obvious influence; wage inequality can be compensated
by long-term social policies; job polarization will not last for long; and
workers’ flow between industries is essentially a result of matching labor
skills with task needs after technological changes. More scholars believe that
the impact of artificial intelligence on employment in the future is controllable,
and the key is in the broad and effective human-computer cooperation
facilitated by the improvement of labor’s skill levels through education and
training.
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I

n recent years, the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) has become an
important subject in employment research. Researching the employment
effects of the application of artificial intelligence in all aspects of production
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we can learn, at a macro level, the directional influence of artificial intelligence on the employment
situation and meanwhile observe, at the micro level, the specific changes of existing work tasks
and income distributions. Before discussing the impact of various aspects, it is necessary to clarify
the concept and application of artificial intelligence and the existing main methods of research into
employment effects. Scholars disagree about the concept of artificial intelligence. In its early stage,
artificial intelligence was described as “machines that think” with the ability to think and act in a
way that will surpass human beings (McCorduck, 1979). Others believed that the demonstration
of such abilities requires specific carriers and external circumstances, for example, both Dreyfus’s
(1972) classic criticism against artificial intelligence① and Searle’s (1992) “biological naturalism”②
argued that the realization of human-like intelligence entails the physical embodiment, like a human,
and certain social backgrounds. At present, a more comprehensive description of the concept of
artificial intelligence comes from the research of MIT in the field of electrical engineering: artificial
intelligence is an organic whole, an expression system for thinking, perception and action, which
is established through models, taking the working-out of test methods as its basic operation mode,
but this system faces certain constraints, which work through algorithms (programs or methods)
(Finlayson et al., 2010).
Since artificial intelligence is entering and reshaping production and life in all aspects, the
description should avoid both Luddism in epistemology and technological determinism to maintain
an objective understanding of artificial intelligence technology (Zhang, 2018).③ Therefore, this essay
holds that artificial intelligence is a technology created for specific tasks and exhibiting similar
levels of human abilities (cognition, thinking, or action), and that this technology needs to work with
corresponding carriers (tools) and application environments. Under existing technological conditions,
the application carrier of artificial intelligence is mainly computerized and automated equipment, and
the application environments refer to circumstances required for the fulfillment of tasks.
At present, the research outside China on the impact of artificial intelligence upon employment
is usually based on the task model approach. Autor et al. (2003) distinguished cognitive and
manual tasks, and routine and non-routine tasks, and in doing so, they mainly intended to
learn how computerization④ changes the demands for job skills. From a “machine’s-eye” view,
they disassembled specific work into different tasks, determined which could be executed by
① Dreyfus’s (1972) critique of artificial intelligence involves four main assumptions of artificial intelligence research:“biology”, “psychology”, “epistemology”,
and “ontology”. In the “biological” assumption, the brain is similar to computer hardware, and thinking is like software; the “psychological” assumption is
that thinking works by performing calculations on symbols (in the form of algorithmic rules); “epistemological” assumption suggests that all activities can be
implemented in the form of predictive rules; and the “ontological” assumption proposes that the reality consists entirely of a set of independent but inseparable
facts.
② Searle (1992) argued that if you want to create a conscious existence, you will have to replicate any physical processes that the brain experiences, to mimic and
awaken consciousness.
③ Stanford University pointed out the artificial intelligence effect in its 2017 report, asserting that new technology will replace the previous technology through
its popularization and turn into the “real” artificial intelligence in the public consciousness, although the previous technology still belongs to the category of
artificial intelligence. Because of the existence of this effect, it is necessary to consider which technologies belong to the category of smart technology before
learning about how the application of smart technology affects employment. Here it may involve both high-tech and the tools that we are used to.
④ Computer science is especially important for the realization of intelligent concepts. Intelligent computing, intelligent information processing, and computer
science are basic dynamics for intelligent realization. This is also an important reason why this essay regards the technology of computerization and automation
based on computerization as the embodiment of artificial intelligence.
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a computer, and described four cases in which workers could be affected by computers in the
workplace; substitution, mutual complementation, imperfect substitution, and conditional mutual
complementation. Autor et al. believed that computers had become an alternative labor force for
many daily tasks and had shown strong mutual complementarity with the workforce performing nonroutine cognitive tasks. However, Autor et al. did not predict complementarity with any labor force
performing non-routine manual tasks (non-routine physical labor) (Frey et al., 2017).①

Impact on the Industrial Distribution of Employment
From the current research results, the agricultural production sector is less affected by artificial
intelligence and the labor force in the manufacturing sector will gradually shift to the service sector
due to the substitution effects of artificial intelligence (Autor et al., 2013), and Zhong Renyao et al.
(2013) believed that this situation is related to the knowledge structure and adaptability of original
practitioners. According to a study by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, by 2024, almost all new jobs
will be concentrated in services, especially in the areas of health care and social assistance services
(Trajtenberg, 2018).
Impact on Agriculture
Although the application of artificial intelligence at present imposes no significant impact on
the number of farmers (Manyika et al., 2017; Frey et al., 2017), artificial intelligence technologies
do transform farmers’ habits and methods in production and strengthen their links with the market.
First, from the perspective of agricultural production, Ampatzidis et al. (2017) pointed out that
currently automation and robots can realize human-machine cooperation through the entire process of
agricultural production, that is, from crop selection to sowing, disaster prevention, and finally to crop
harvesting. Second, from the perspective of farmers’ connection with the market, Lele et al. (2017)
believed that the current transformation of intelligent and digital technology, in terms of the former’s
speed and scope, is conducive to the inclusive development of agriculture and rural areas, capable
of truly realizing the close connection between farmers and the market in each production process,
and able to indirectly increase farmers’ incomes by providing higher levels of education, health care,
finance and market services.
As existing research has shown, the impact of artificial intelligence on agricultural production
is mainly concentrated on transforming agricultural production methods, improving production
efficiency, and increasing farmers’ income, but the substitution effect on farmers is not obvious.
Possibly it is because during the transition from mechanization to automation in the process of
agricultural production, the change of ways to accomplish production tasks do not affect the demand
① Frey et al. (2017) further redefined the task model in their research, subdividing the labor input of non-routine tasks into perception and manipulation tasks,
creative intelligence tasks, and social intelligence tasks. According to Arntz et al. (2016), this redefinition (extension) has exceeded the definition of routine and
non-routine tasks proposed by Autor et al.
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for farmers in the agricultural production process, or are far less comparable to the influence that
agricultural mechanization once exerted.
Impact on Manufacturing
Focused on the impact of industrial robots on the US labor market, Acemoglu et al. (2017)
studied the relationships between the large-scale use of industrial robots in 19 industries (mainly
manufacturing) and the employment rates and wages in 722 commuting zones from 1993 to 2007.
They found that the large-scale application of industrial robots has a significant negative correlation
with employment and wages, and concluded that the substitution effect of industrial robots on the
labor market at present is greater than its creative effect, suggesting that each additional robot per one
thousand workers reduces employment by about 0.18-0.34%, and wages by 0.25-0.5 percent. Thus,
they deduce that the number of lost jobs from 1990 to 2007 due to the use of industrial robots in the
industrial sector ranges between 360,000 to 670,000. At the same time, artificial intelligence also
profoundly affects the production models and production systems within the manufacturing industry
and changes the skill demands on workers within these systems. Yin et al. (2017) examined the
changes in production systems during each industrial revolution and found that in comparison with
the assembly line, Toyota production system (TPS), and cellular manufacturing created by the second
industrial revolution, the flexible manufacturing system (FMS) and Seru① production system, which
were fostered by the third industrial revolution and use computerization and industrial robots as their
software and hardware bases, can better meet the demands of product markets for mass customization
under industry 4.0 conditions. According to Yin et al., this will not only change the pattern of future
manufacturing development but also impose further requirements for the improvement of workers’
skills.
In the research on the industrial distribution of artificial intelligence’s impact upon employment,
the manufacturing industry has been highlighted. This is not only because the manufacturing
industry itself is vulnerable to industrial robots and automation, but also because the manufacturing
industry absorbs a large amount of ordinary labor and its labor distribution is more concentrated than
that of the agriculture and service industries. The impact of artificial intelligence on manufacturing
is not limited to the number of jobs nor is it completely negative. The specific effects depend on
the characteristics and attributes of the industry (Acemoglu et al., 2017); it is widely expected that
the positive results of industrial robot applications are directly related to productivity, especially in
industrial environments, where the use of industrial robots for specific tasks will reduce human
workloads and possible dangers while saving labor time and increasing leisure. The primary
consideration for negative influences is the impact of industrial robots on employment, and the
accountability for accidents while using industrial robot applications.
① Seru production is a production method that can change its own production content in accordance to the needs of different production tasks; it is suitable for
multi-variety and small-batch market demand and has both efficiency and flexibility. Since its inception, Seru production has been rapidly popularized in the
manufacturing industries in Japan, becoming an assemble system adopted by many Japanese electronics companies.
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Impact on the Service Industry
According to the research of Frey et al. (2017), many workers in the service industry are at risk
of being replaced by computers while they must accept new colleagues from the manufacturing
industries. Workers engaged in telemarketing, insurance underwriting, transportation services,
photography, data maintenance, etc. are groups that are very likely to be replaced by computers.
However, the creative effect of artificial intelligence has also led to an increase in the demand for
labor in some occupations, those that have witnessed the fastest growth involve kindergarten (and
primary school) teachers, accounting and finance staff, nurses, healthcare consultants, therapists and
social information workers. For the growing amount of labor demand in the social information sector,
Deming (2017) believed that the task requirements for social skills cannot yet be met by computerized
and automated technologies, which will encourage workers to improve their social skills which will
allow them to change their work choices. Moreover, he points out that from 1980 to 2012, jobs with
high social skill intensity increased by 24% in the US, while the share of employment grew by 7.2%
and wages rose by 26% in the same period.

Impact on Jobs
From the existing literature, the impact of artificial intelligence on jobs not only involves changes
in both the number of jobs and the nature of the tasks, namely, substitution and creation effects, but
also causes job polarization and accelerates human-machine cooperation.
Job Polarization
The computer revolution in the 20th century and the rapid development of artificial intelligence
technology in the 21st century have worked together to significantly impact jobs and a distinct sign of
this is the reduced number of jobs with middle incomes and middle-skill requirements (Autor, 2013;
Frey et al., 2017). Correspondingly, high-paid mental jobs (cognitive tasks) and low-paid physical labor
occupations have increased, and the number of employed people has also changed accordingly. The
labor market has shown the trend of polarization and affected workers’ employment choices (Goos
et al., 2007). As Autor et al. (2013) have noticed, the job-polarization trend in the US labor market is
mainly reflected in the increased number of low-skill service jobs while in the routine labor-intensive
market, the polarization of employment and wages is more obvious. At the same time, Jerbashian (2016)
focused on single-technology fields using data from 10 European countries to prove that the fall of IT
prices is related to a decline in the share of middle wage occupations and an increase in the share of
high wage occupations, but its impact on the proportion of the lowest paid occupations is less, which
is a proof that the intelligent technology represented by computerization has the distinct potential to
cause further job polarization.
For the trend of polarization, Autor (2013) believed that it is difficult to ascertain the
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complementarity in other areas and the countervailing effects of rising demands in labor markets were
difficult to determine as job polarization would not continue indefinitely. Frey et al. (2017) pointed
out that computerization was mainly limited to low-skill and low-wage occupations, the labor market
polarization would stop expanding and its impact can be alleviated through corresponding measures,
that is, low-skilled workers would be redistributed to tasks that are not affected by computerization,
but workers must improve their creative thinking and social skills in order to win these opportunities.
Replacement of Occupations
The substitution effect of artificial intelligence is more obvious than the impact of any previous
technological progress (Cao Jing & Zhou Yalin, 2018). According to a World Bank survey, 57% jobs
in more than 50 countries in 2013 were affected by automation technology (Manyika et al., 2017).
In the US, 47% of employment faces the high risk of substitution (computerization), the replacement
rate is negatively correlated with the requirements of wage and occupational skill, and among the
702 occupations reviewed, workers engaging in transportation, logistics services, office clerks, and
some production departments are at high risk of being replaced (Frey et al., 2017). Arntz et al. (2016)
analyzed the extent to which jobs in 21 OECD countries could be automatically replaced and the
result showed that 9% of jobs in the US are at high risks①. Likewise, David (2017) found that 55%
of jobs in Japan are at “risk” and that workers in non-regular employment were more likely to be
replaced. In 2016, the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) calculated
the probability of jobs replaced by machines in Germany, with a result of 13%. In comparison,
Oschinski et al. (2017) surveyed the Canadian labor market and found that the jobs at risk to high
automation account for only 1.7 percent of employment. Scholars differ in terms of the results of their
calculations and this is possibly caused by disparities between statistical specifications, overestimated
technological capabilities, lagging utilization levels, and the heterogeneity of workplaces (Arntz et al.,
2016). In addition, substitution effects also vary due to differences between industries, and between
time series. As Jiang Jinqiu and Du Yuhong (2015) have found, employment in different industries in
short, medium and long terms has different responses to technological progress.
Regarding the development trend of occupation replacement, the traditional view represented
by technological unemployment still has a strong voice. As Trajtenberg (2018) pointed out, some
new “technology enthusiasts” believed that artificial intelligence would replace most people's jobs
in a predictable period, releasing huge productive forces, and that subsequently there would occur
negative influences on employment expectations and income distributions. In this regard, scholars
hold different views. For example, Arntz et al. (2016) suggested that the existing substitution effects
have been overstated and that the research results based on the distinguishing of tasks represented

① Arntz et al. (2016) regard the automation substitution with probability more than 70% as high risk; the value that Oschinski et al. (2017) chose while considering
the risk levels of automation approximates the former, and their calculation results for the proportion of the high-risk occupations from high to low are Austria
and Germany (12%), Spain (11.5%), Slovak Republic (10.5%), United Kingdom, Norway, Netherlands, and Czech Republic (10%, respectively), Canada, Denmark,
France, and the US (9%, respectively), Sweden, Poland, Japan, Finland, and Belgium (7%, respectively), Estonia (6.5%), and South Korea (6%).
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merely the possibility of substitution, rather than the actual situation; Autor (2015) and Brynjolfsson et
al. (2018) pointed out that most automation systems lack flexibility, and were unable to accommodate
the demands of some non-routine tasks. Cao Jing and Zhou Yalin (2018) also believed that the risk of
jobs being automated does not mean actual job losses. In addition, the more compromised view is that
technological progress will benefit everyone in the long run. But in the short term, not everyone will
be a winner (Cortes et al., 2014). Manyika et al. (2017) considered the impact of automation on jobs
(occupations), and believed that the transformation at present is full of challenges, but by 2030 most
workplaces will be able to provide sufficient jobs for full employment.①
Job Creation
Although artificial intelligence applications (computerization and automation at present) have
shown relatively obvious substitution effects, their creative effects still exist. Acemoglu (2017)
proposed that automation would generate new employment opportunities by creating new job tasks
while reducing employment. The newly created jobs will consist of two parts, one is the growth of
labor demand that artificial intelligence applications bring about by increasing workloads; the other
is the new types of jobs around artificial intelligence (algorithm development, AI-designer trainer,
intelligent equipment maintenance, etc.). These two employment groups have something in common,
i.e., both workers related to the emerging industry of general-purpose technology (GPT)② itself,
and those relevant with the frontier fields in whose major application domains the general purpose
technology is deployed, are characterized with youth and entrepreneurship, and meanwhile qualified
with the technological knowledge reserve and skills required by the new general-purpose technology
(Trajtenberg, 2018).
In addition to the increase of jobs, Wang Jun and Yang Wei (2017) proposed that the progress of
new technologies, including artificial intelligence, has an expansive impact on employment and is
conducive to improving the quality of work. According to Kremer’s (1993) O-ring model, the growth
in task productivity increases the value of the remaining tasks in a production chain, while artificial
intelligence helps increase the value of remaining manual labor production links when it improves
the efficiency of routine physical labor. The first prerequisite for improvement is the complementarity
between man and machine in the task process. From 1988 to 2004, ATMs caused a one-third decrease
of bank tellers on average in the branches of US banks, but the number of branches throughout the US
rose by more than 40%; at the same time, bank tellers were also liberated from the chores of routine
cash-handling tasks: they gradually turned from their previous jobs towards sales, customer business,
and each occupation thus created more value (Autor, 2015).
① Manyika et al. (2017) believed that theoretically half of activities in work at present can be accomplished through automation, but only a very small number (5%)
can be fully automated. Despite of this, the impact of transformation still exists, for nearly one-third of the activities for nearly 60% of the occupations can be
automated, which means that all workers are facing a lot of workplace transformation and changes (https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-Insights/future-oforganizations-and-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skillsand-wages).
② At the NBER conference in early 2018, artificial intelligence was considered to have great potential for becoming a new general-purpose technology, and it
was pointed out that in its constantly expanding application area, AI would bring about a wave of complementary innovations.
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Job Cooperation
The study of relationships between a worker on his job and artificial intelligence applications
can be understood through the conflict between McCarthy and Douglas’s core views, i.e., whether
to employ an increasingly powerful combination of computer software and hardware to replace
workers in the workplace, or to use the same tool to expand the capabilities of workers in terms of
brains, society and the economy. There is no right or wrong position (or opinion) in this debate, only
that a controversy about phenomena or trends would lead to a bias when debaters considered these
two problems outside of the real situation (Markoff, 2015), and the practical application of technology
might provide more inspiration for us instead.
The computer system devised by Douglas C. Engelbart opened a door to office automation,
some jobs have been taken over by many artificial intelligence applications (programs, equipment,
etc.), but workers accomplishing tasks still have partnerships with those on other jobs, and the
difference lies in the added cooperation between workers and machines. Therefore, human-machine
cooperation and human-computer interaction determine that we will regard the carriers of artificial
intelligence as partners (Markoff, 2015), and to realize human-computer interaction and facilitate
these carriers to play their roles in teamwork we need to be qualified with the necessary knowledge
and skills concerning the task and other essential features including team knowledge, leadership,
communication, monitoring, and feedback capabilities.
Since 2009, applied research oriented toward deep learning has yielded significant results.
Changes in the process of artificial intelligence innovation have led to a sequence of key issues in
policy and management areas (Cockburn et al., 2018). Specifically, machine learning can incorporate
as many variables as possible, stripping out the influencing factors that traditional methods cannot
approach (Camerer, 2018). With the development of machine learning, the artificial intelligence
applications in the research on relationships between prediction and decision-making have enhanced
their prediction ability and decreased their prediction cost under uncertainty, hence artificial
intelligence thinking can be regarded as a supplement to human judgment (Agrawal et al., 2018). In
reference to existing research, human-computer cooperation on a job will have a clear advantage in
the future, therefore, learning how to cooperate with artificial intelligence is also an indispensable
skill for future workers.

Impact on Wages
Existing research emphasizes the impact of artificial intelligence and other technological progress
on wages, not only because the theme of income inequality is important, but also because the
evolution of wage distribution provides market value information on different types of skills (Acemoglu
et al., 2011). In addition, the issue of inequality between workers in the workplace, which is caused
by artificial intelligence, may be directly related to the impact of artificial intelligence applications on
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wages (Chace, 2016).
Impact on Individual Workers
Starting from the premise that workers have been replaced due to technological progress,
Acemoglu et al. (2017) argued that the application of industrial robots in manufacturing industries
has a strong negative impact on the wages of manufacturing workers. Korinek et al. (2017) classified
the different impacts of artificial intelligence on wages and welfare. First, in the best scenario (perfect
market where individuals invest in technological progress and carry out risk aversion), technological
progress always makes everyone better off. Second, in the second-best case (perfect market, which
is accompanied by costless redistribution), if redistribution is given a full play of its role, there will
be a win-win situation between workers and technological progress, but when there is not enough
redistribution capacity to make up for the workers’ losses, it will inevitably lead to resistance, and
in the case of excessive income disparity, the improvement of production by means of technological
progress will be affected. Third, in a perfect market (with redistribution at a price), wages and welfare
will be affected in the short term, but Pareto Improvement exists in the long run. When technological
progress causes capital monopoly, it will realize relatively fair resource allocations through
redistribution although this depends on the costs of redistribution. Fourth, in the imperfect market,
a Pareto Improvement is difficult to achieve, and technological progress will have a great impact on
workers’ welfare.
From the perspective of workers’ educational returns, Brown et al. (2002) argued that wage
inequality based on educational returns will expand in the context of technological impact, and this
is a result from the fact that the increased mutually complementary level of skills and capital leads to
the rise in the demand for high-skilled workers. In the long run, however, unless the improvement of
education levels and skills is restricted, the education returns of the higher-educated workers would
gradually return to the market average. The resulting countermeasure is to strive for the secondbest by means of measures including the development of intellectual property rights, and maximize
the Pareto Improvement effect of artificial intelligence in the win-win form of facilitating the
improvement of wages, welfare and expanding the application of intelligent technology. When it is
impossible to create the second-best situation, it is necessary to facilitate the adjustment of resource
allocations and provide support for those who are disadvantaged in the face of artificial intelligence.
From the perspective of political economy, Trajtenberg (2018) believed that the realization of “humanenhancing innovations”① is a matter of orientation, in which government policies play a key role, and
needs to place extra emphasis on education, labor training, and service professionalization.

① Trajtenberg (2018) held that technological innovation should aim at the improvement of the skill level of people rather than the substitution for the needs of
human skills. He gives an example: AI data mining for electronic medical records can be used for the evaluation of subsequent drug efficacy, but does not
replace doctors, rather, it enhances the combination of technology and doctors' ability, resulting in better doctors. Therefore, it belongs to "human-enhancing
innovations" (HEI) instead of "human-replacing innovations" (HRI).
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Impact on Industries as a Whole
First, within the same industry, job polarization itself represents wage differences based on skill
levels. With respect to the specific degree of differences, the rapid development of technological
progress has led to growing gaps between the middle and bottom groups in the wage distribution
process, and this trend will continue for the long term (Kearney et al., 2015). At the same time,
in consideration of management and costs, enterprises with higher levels of artificial intelligence
applications may possibly outsource low-skilled jobs to other enterprises, and give high wages to
skilled workers who remain inside the outsourcing enterprises (Aghion et al., 2017); consequently, this
also widens wage gaps.
Second, for different industries, the absolute value of comparative wages does not make much
sense due to the difference in the nature of jobs. However, by comparing the changes in wages we can
see different responses that industries make to technological progress. Taking the service industry
as an example, Autor et al. (2013) found that in the past 25 years, the actual income and employment
rates of workers in the majority of low-skilled occupations and of industries they belong to, have
stagnated or declined, but employment and income in the service industry is an exception. From 1980
to 2005, employees without university degrees increased their working time in the service industry by
more than 50%, but at the same time, their real hourly wages increased by about 11%, exceeding the
wage growth of other low-skilled occupations and industries.

Conclusion and Evaluation
The current research consists of three main aspects; phenomenon description, detail analysis and
trend prediction. It involves theoretical and empirical investigations and presents both positive and
negative views. These views differ simply due to their different research perspectives and contents
and involve nothing about right or wrong. Artificial intelligence has shown some negative effects on
employment at present, and its destruction mechanisms, including substitution effects, the reduction
of job numbers, and the widening of wage gaps, have also been recognized by many scholars, but the
rapid progress of artificial intelligence cannot really play its role without the corresponding upgrading
of other industries, and we need to continue observing whether these negative effects still exist
after society, industries or organizations are correspondingly adjusted. However, it is still possible
to grasp the future trends. The fact that artificial intelligence and its carriers used in the production
sector are still under the background of computerization and automation (Acemoglu et al., 2018;
Frey et al., 2017), the main considerations in the future should be the improvement of workers’ skill
levels conditioned on artificial intelligence applications and the demands for employing education
and training to help them adapt to technological progress (Arntz et al., 2016). For the realization
of effective human-computer cooperation, the 2018 report of : The Age of Artificial Intelligence:
Towards a European Strategy for Human-Centric Machines issued by the European Political
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Strategy Center① suggests that some workers will indeed be unemployed because of the application
of artificial intelligence and other technologies, but the future focus is on facilitating the transition
and improvement of skills on the basis of providing support and security to high-risk workers and we
should attach importance to the development of a symbiosis between humans and machines to realize
the improvement of workers’ abilities and value, in lockstep with the development levels of artificial
intelligence.
At present, the research into the impact of artificial intelligence on employment is primarily about
achievements, but by reviewing the literature, we can find that there are still some problems in terms
of research direction, interdisciplinary cooperation, and research objectives.
First, existing research is mostly focused on the substitution and creation effects of artificial
intelligence on employment, paying more attention to the changes of employment quantity, but less to
what economic and social significance the changes of industries, professions and occupations behind
those two may have. Ma Hong et al. (2013) believed that employment quantity is only one aspect of
employment structure, the creation and disappearance of large numbers of jobs simultaneously exist
behind the changes in numbers, and have totally different meanings to the labor market. In addition,
no research at present can accurately quantify the impact of artificial intelligence development on
employment prospects. Therefore, while examining the changes of employment quantity, future
research should pay more attention to the impact on the labor market and the economic society, which
is represented by quantitative changes, and thus displays what significance the investigation into
employment effects has in practice.
Second, existing research lacks cooperation with researchers in artificial intelligence technology.
The biggest difference between the application of artificial intelligence and that of other technologies
is that artificial intelligence is combined with jobs more deeply and more complicatedly. Economists
and sociologists can finish the division and weight distribution of work tasks, but do not know whether
a task can be independently accomplished by artificial intelligence, or if it must involve human
participation. Arntz et al. (2016) argued that existing research tends to overestimate the capabilities of
artificial intelligence technology and ignore backward application levels②. So, the cooperation with
technological researchers is required to achieve an accurate match of tasks and technologies which
will improve the relevance and accuracy of the analytical results.
Third, current research in China mostly focuses on status quo description and trend forecasting
and lacks empirical research into the specific impacts of artificial intelligence on employment. This
is possibly because the current insufficient statistics for labor market data in China cannot support
the micro-level study of employment effects. It involves the particularity of computer capital and

① The Center acknowledges the positive role of artificial intelligence, but also argues that artificial intelligence can have an unstable impact on economic and
social life, and analyzes in this report the opportunities and challenges brought by artificial intelligence(https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/
age-artificial-intelligence_en).
② According to a monitoring report released by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy in 2015, the digitization of the German manufacturing
sector is still in a rather low degree, and will remain in the state of slow advancement until 2020 due to the restriction of technological conditions (Arntz et al.,
2016).
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technology investment that Autor et al. (2003) mentioned in their task model, and also the factors
that are difficult to investigate within the current application scope of artificial intelligence in China,
especially the situation where the ranges and levels of automation and computerized equipment
applications in manufacturing enterprises are uneven and in lack of practical basis for shaping
representative research. Therefore, as China is paying increasing attention to artificial intelligence and
the field of application continues to expand, more data at sector or industry levels, and at the national
level or regional levels will be needed in the future to consolidate the data base of empirical research
in this area.
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